<div dir="auto"><div dir="auto">Hi Folks,</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">FYI and worth reading from RIPE Labs...<b></b></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Cheers,</div><div dir="auto">Noah</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container" dir="auto"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">---------- Forwarded message ---------<br>From: <strong class="gmail_sendername" dir="auto">Alun Davies</strong> <span dir="auto"><<a href="mailto:adavies@ripe.net">adavies@ripe.net</a>></span><br>Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026, 4:27 pm<br>Subject: [routing-wg] New on RIPE Labs: Beyond Origin Validation - Four Classes of Routing Attack Nobody Is Validating<br>To:  <<a href="mailto:routing-wg@ripe.net">routing-wg@ripe.net</a>><br></div><br><br><div dir="ltr">Dear colleagues,<br><br>Antonio Prado and colleagues revisit fifteen years of routing security research and argue that, while origin validation has made real progress, four major classes of routing attack remain outside the scope of cryptographic validation:<br><br><a href="https://labs.ripe.net/author/antonio-prado/beyond-origin-validation-four-classes-of-routing-attack-nobody-is-validating/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">https://labs.ripe.net/author/antonio-prado/beyond-origin-validation-four-classes-of-routing-attack-nobody-is-validating/</a><br><br>Comments and feedback are very welcome as always!<br><br>Kind regards,<br>Alun Davies<br>RIPE Labs Editor<br>RIPE NCC</div>
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